Volume 17
Issue 2 Spring 1977
Spring 1977

Selected Welfare Implications of Rapid Energy-Related
Development Impact
Muelen Allen Vander Jr.
Orman H. Paananen

Recommended Citation
Muelen A. Vander Jr. & Orman H. Paananen, Selected Welfare Implications of Rapid Energy-Related
Development Impact, 17 Nat. Resources J. 301 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol17/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

SELECTED WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF RAPID
ENERGY-RELATED DEVELOPMENT IMPACT
ALLEN VANDER MUELEN JR.* and ORMAN H. PAANANEN*

INTRODUCTION
In this paper we will analyze selected welfare problems posed by
the rapid development of energy resources in the Rocky Mountain
region and evaluate policies designed to deal with them. Our primary
concern is the welfare of the original residents of the small, relatively
isolated communities that are growing rapidly as a direct result of
energy related investment projects. The rapid growth of these communities brings both advantages and disadvantages to those living in
them. The focus a generation ago was on the benefits accompanying
rapid growth; today attention has shifted to the costs growth imposes. This change in perspective is reflected in our choice of words;
"boomtowns" have become "impacted communities."
By welfare problems we mean problems of economic efficiency
and equity. From the point of view of economic efficiency the question is whether the rapid development of energy reserves in the
Rocky Mountain region represents the best use of available resources.
The equity problem is whether practical steps can be taken to insure
those adversely affected will be fairly compensated. These basic
economic questions involve much more than the well being of the
original residents of these communities. The first section of the paper
includes a review of these broader issues and our justification for
limiting our analysis to the effect of energy development on the
welfare of residents of impacted communities.
The impact experience of Sweetwater County, Wyoming is summarized for the period 1971-1975 and the effect of impact on original residents is assessed in the second part. Rock Springs, a classic
example of impact, is located in Sweetwater County. Use of a case
study permits us to be specific about the problems and to measure
their effect on residents. In the last part of the paper we summarize
our review of the impact's effect on original residents and advocate a
policy that would require investors in major energy projects to negotiate a contractual agreement with communities which will grow
rapidly as a result of the project. We argue that such a policy is a
more direct attack on impact problems than current policies and that
*Assistant Professors of Economics, University of Wyoming.
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it would lead to more equitable and efficient energy development
decisions.
THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPENSATION
FOR EVALUATING CHANGES IN WELFARE

In this section we examine criteria for determining whether a
change in the state of the world such as an energy development
project increases the welfare of society, and we defend our application of a modified and limited form of the Pareto criterion to energy
development projects in the Rocky Mountain region. We argue the
importance of compensating those adversely affected by a project
where it is feasible to do so and single out original residents of
impacted communities as a group who can and should be given
special consideration.
We are concerned with evaluating the effect of a particular project
on social welfare rather than determining the best possible state of
the world. The relevant issue for our purpose is whether a proposed
project increases or decreases welfare. Whether alternative projects or
a different energy strategy such as development of solar or nuclear
power would result in a greater improvement in welfare is beyond
the scope of this paper.
We accept as a starting point that group welfare is positively related to the welfare of the individuals in it and nothing else. Beginning with this assumption, three criteria for determining whether a
given change in the state of the world improves group welfare have
been discussed in economic literature.
The first involves measuring individual welfare in terms of a
numerical index and defining an increase in the sum of individual
welfare indices as an improvement in group welfare. The interpersonal comparisons of welfare required under this criterion involve
metaphysical and psychological problems economists prefer to avoid,
but the work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern have renewed interest in the possibility of using such a criterion.' We share an aversion
to a cardinal measure of individual welfare and make no attempt to
use this criterion in the paper.
The Pareto criterion for an improvement in group welfare is a
second possibility; a change that helps some members of the group
1. J. VAN NEUMANN and 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 17 (3rd ed. 1953), 17 ff. for discussion of numerical utilities. For a
discussion of the possibility of basing welfare criteria on cardinal measure of individual
welfare, see Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and InterpersonalComparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955).
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and hurts no member increases group welfare.' By extension, a
change that hurts some and helps none decreases welfare, and
changes that affect no member leave group welfare unchanged. The
Pareto criterion rests on an ethical judgment that has wide appeal
and it avoids interpersonal comparisons of welfare. Unfortunately it
has limited applicability. Changes that are controversial and involve
significant policy questions are changes that help some while hurting
others and these cannot be evaluated by the Pareto criterion.
Changes in the distribution of income, for example, cannot be evaluated under the Pareto criterion except when those whose incomes ate
reduced approve the change.'
Many changes involve income distribution effects that are incidental rather than deliberate. In situations where the purpose of a proposed change is to allocate resources more efficiently rather than
redistribute income the Pareto criterion can be applied if those who
gain from the change are required to compensate those who lose. If
winners are better off after compensating losers, then the Pareto
criterion for an improvement in group welfare is satisfied; after compensation payments are made some are helped and none are hurt. If
winners are not able to compensate losers, then the change results in
an unambiguous decrease in welfare; after compensation none are
helped and some are hurt. If winners are left no better off after
compensating losers, the change after compensation has no affect on
group welfare. The main difficulty in extending the applicability of
the Pareto criterion by requiring adequate compensation payments
to those who would be left worse off is the cost of arranging the
necessary payments. This problem will be examined after considering
the third criterion.
The third criterion attempts to avoid the difficulties of implementing the Pareto criterion by substituting possible compensation
for actual compensation; if winners were able to compensate losers,
the proposed change improves group welfare. The criterion only
requires that compensation be possible, not that it actually be paid.
This potential compensation criterion involves three difficulties.
First, it is not a simple matter to determine whether compensation is
possible in the absence of mutually agreeable compensation pay2. The Pareto criterion is the basis of efforts to develop welfare criteria that do not
involve interpersonal comparisons of welfare. See Mishan, A Survey of Welfare Economics,
1939-1959, 70 ECON. J. 1977 (1960) for an interpretative survey of these efforts. The
article is reprinted in E. Mishan, WELFARE ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as Mishan ].
3. We prefer to define income redistribution to include only those cases where some
individuals are left worse off in order to help others. For the alternative definition see
Hochman and Rogers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 542 (1969).
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ments between winners and losers. Cost-benefit analysis is an attempt
to determine whether compensation is possible, but competent
studies are expensive and often inconclusive.
Second, in contrast to the Pareto criterion where income distribution is avoided by requiring that compensation be paid, the potential
compensation criterion ignores the income distribution problem.
Third, efforts to define conditions justifying a proposed change
under the potential compensation criterion have been shown to be
inconsistent. The Kaldor-Hicks rule that a proposed change should be
made if it is possible for winners to compensate losers in the changed
state has been shown to be reversible by Scitovsky.4 The same rule,
under certain circumstances, would call for a return to the original
state. Scitovsky's additional requirement that reversibility not be
possible also involves consistency problems.' These contradictions
only arise if compensation is not actually paid.6 The conceptual and
practical difficulties with the potential compensation criterion justify
a policy of requiring actual compensation when feasible.
As noted earlier, the major obstacle to implementing the Pareto
criterion in cases where some individuals would be harmed by the
proposed change is the transactions' costs of arranging the necessary
compensation payments. If the sum of transactions' costs and compensation payments is greater than gains to winners, then arranging
and paying compensation results in a clear loss of welfare. Since
transactions' costs are positively related to the number of negotiating
parties, reducing the number of parties by having groups rather than
individuals negotiate is an effective means of reducing costs. Class
action lawsuits are clear examples of efforts to economize on transactions' costs. Labor negotiations are another example, although in
this case group action increases bargaining power as well as reducing
transactions' costs.
Compensation agreements by group negotiations satisfy the Pareto
criterion only if there is consensus within each group. Normally
interests of some members of a group are advanced at the expense of
other members in group negotiations. When this is the case, group
4. The Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation criterion was advanced in Kaldor, Welfare
Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549
(1939) and Hicks, Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON J. 696 (1939). The Scitovsky criticism appears in Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV.
ECON. STUD. 77 (1941). For a summary of the controversy, see Mishan, supra note 2, at
37-45.
5. Gorman, The Intransitivity of Certain Criteria Used in Welfare Economics, 7 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 36 (1955). For a summary see Mishan, supra note 2, at 52.
6. 1. Little, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 98 (in paperback, 2d ed. 1957).
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negotiations are not a perfect substitute for individual negotiations
and compensation agreements will not fulfill the Pareto criterion.
Nevertheless, in many instances individual negotiations are not
feasible because of high transactions' costs but group negotiations
are. Under such circumstances group negotiations are better than no
negotiations.
While group negotiated compensation arrangements do not normally satisfy the Pareto criterion, they do provide a means for
considering important costs imposed by proposed changes when individual negotiations are not feasible because of prohibitive transactions' costs. Providing this opportunity by implementing group
negotiations where these are feasible and individual arrangements are
not is justified on the grounds that group negotiations make it more
likely that arbitrary and unintended redistribution of income is
avoided and that welfare is improved.
We believe that significant costs are imposed on individuals in
impacted communities in the Rocky Mountain region which are not
taken into account under existing rules for making social decisions. It
is feasible to implement compensation requirements through group
negotiations between representatives of these injured parties and
representatives of those who stand to gain from the proposed projects. Since it is not feasible to insist on individual compensation
arrangements because of the numbers of people involved, group
negotiations should be required. As a first step in exploring the possibilities of establishing compensation requirements for energy related projects in the Rocky Mountain region, we classify affected
individuals into groups.
The groups that are significantly affected by energy development
projects are: investors who provide the necessary capital; the workers
and their families who move into the areas where projects are located
to take advantage of employment opportunities; ecologists and environmentalists concerned about the impact of projects on the quality of life; consumers of the energy that will be produced; and
original residents of areas impacted by rapid population increases
accompanying major energy projects.
There are two other groups that are less directly affected and
whose members are not as easily identified. Future generations are
affected because the energy and environmental resources available to
them depends on the decisions we make about energy development
now. All the members of our present society whose standard of living
and employment possibilities depend on the availability of an adequate energy supply are also affected.
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Some of these groups cannot be directly involved in compensation
arrangements. The latter two groups mentioned are difficult to identify and effectively organize. Their interests may be represented
through the interests of other groups, but there is no practical way to
directly involve them in compensating arrangements.
The environmental group is already organized and does participate
in the political and judicial processes through which decisions are
made. Whether existing arrangements for including their interests are
adequate is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our concern is with the remaining groups: investors; newcomer
employees and their families; consumers of energy that will be produced by the proposed projects; and the original residents of communities in which newcomers will live. The first three of these groups
can be distinguished from the fourth. They share a common interest
in the project and have elected to participate; the original residents
did not necessarily choose to become involved.
Contractual agreements bind the first three groups together. They
willingly participate in the project because they expect to be adequately compensated for any costs the project imposes on them. The
investors provide the necessary capital because they expect to make a
profit; workers move into the area because they expect to find better
employment opportunities; consumers of the energy agree to pay for
the costs imposed on the other two groups. We assume members of
these groups are being adequately compensated for their participation in the proposed project. Their willing consent based on selfappraisal of their interests is a necessary condition for involvement.
Original residents of communities which will grow rapidly as a
direct result of the project are affected by the change but do not
participate on the basis of group contractual agreements from which
they hope to benefit. They are an identifiable group whose welfare is
not explicitly taken into account through the processes by which a
decision that significantly affects them is made.
They can choose not to be involved by moving away from the
community, but since they did not choose to do this prior to the
changes imposed on them by the project, the moving option probably leaves them worse off than they were before the project. We
ignore the unlikely borderline case where they were indifferent to
moving or staying before the project. Unlike the other groups participating in the project, their interests are not explicitly protected
under existing contractual or social rules. For this reason we single
them out as identifiable group deserving special consideration.
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THE EFFECT OF DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY RESOURCES

ON THE WELFARE OF ORIGINAL RESIDENTS
In this section we consider the impact of rapid growth on the
welfare of the original residents of the affected areas. Sweetwater
County in southwestern Wyoming is used to illustrate impact problems. Sweetwater County contains the city of Rock Springs, a widely
discussed example of severe impact. Increased trona mining as well as
energy related development has contributed to the county's rapid
growth.
Energy development in the Rocky Mountain region usually means
rapid population growth in areas where projects are located. The
basic reason is the region is sparsely populated with small, widely
separated communities and the number of employees required for a
project especially during the construction period is much greater
than the local supply. Meeting labor force needs requires bringing
workers into the area.
The number of workers that must be brought in may exceed the
population of communities located nearest the project site. Distances
between communities limit the number of places within commuting
range of the site. The result is a rapid, relatively large increase in the
area work force and in the populations of the communities accessible
to the project site. This rapid and relatively large population increase
is the basic cause of impact problems.
Sweetwater County is a dramatic example of the underlying cause
of impact. According to the 1970 Census, Sweetwater County's
population was 18,391. Approximately 87 percent of the population
lived in Rock Springs and Green River which had 1970 populations
of 11,674 and 4,340 respectively. No other community in the
county has a population of more than 350. Green River is located 15
miles west of Rock Springs. There was no other community whose
population exceeded 650 within 100 miles of Rock Springs. Rock
Springs, Green River, and a small number of nearby communities
with populations of a few hundred or less had to absorb virtually all
of the population growth associated with energy related projects east
of Rock Springs and increased trona mining west of Green River.
These projects have triggered a dramatic increase in employment
and population in Sweetwater County. Employment increased by
126 percent between 1970 and 1974.1 The change is more spectacular if we use monthly data. Employment was 7,081 in March of
7. Employment and population estimates used in the discussion are summarized in Table
1, at 27. Selected relationships are illustrated in Figure 1, at 10.
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1971 when the rapid increase began and reached a monthly high of
18,029 in October 1974, an increase of 155 percent in 32 years. The
increase in population between 1970 and 1974 is conservatively estimated at 87 percent.
This rate of change would impose serious problems of adjustment
on residents even if all sectors grew at the same rate. The problem is
compounded because those sectors of the local economy that provide goods and services to residents, the local service sectors, have
not grown as rapidly as total employment or population. Employment in local service sectors increased by only 63 percent between
1970 and 1974.
There is also a marked imbalance in rates of growth between local
service sectors. Employment in the private local service sectors grew
more than twice as rapidly as employment in the public local service
sector. Private service employment grew by 77 percent and public
service employment grew by 31 percent during the 1970-1974
period. Rates of change in population, total employment, and employment in public and private service sectors are depicted in figure
1.
The demand for local services varies with population, while the
supply of such services is related to employment in the service sectors. The failure of service employment to keep pace with population
increases implies a relative shortage of local services, especially in the
public sector. The result is an increase in the price of local services
which has an adverse effect on the welfare of area residents. The
price increase may take the form of either an explicit rise in money
prices of reduced levels of service. Whether residents must pay more
money for a service or pay the same nominal price for poorer service,
the cost of the service to them has increased.
The shortage of local public services is more critical for two
reasons. First, the shortage has been much greater in the public than
the private sector. Private services have responded much more rapidly
to the increases in demand accompanying population growth. The
greater lag in the response of the public sector reflects the effect of
both political and institutional constraints. In addition, it is more
difficult to find substitutes for local public goods than for local
private goods. A family in Sweetwater County can take a Saturday
trip to Salt Lake City, Utah and purchase private goods. The price
will be increased by the additional transportation costs, but except
for housing, goods and services purchased out of town are ready
substitutes for local goods and services.
In the case of public goods and housing the family can substitute
out-of-town goods for local goods only by moving and having the
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employed members of the household commute the greater distance
to the work site. Commuting is expensive and must be done every
work day. Consequently, the cost of substituting out-of-area goods
PERCENT CHANGE
OVER 1970

EMPLOYMENT

POPULATION
(ESTIMATED)
PRIVATE SERV
EMPLOYMENT

PUBLIC SERVICE
EMPLOYMENT

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

FIGURE 1
Percent Changes in Population, Total Employment, Local Service, and
Private Employment in Sweetwater County: 1970-1975

YEAR
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for local goods is much more costly in the case of public goods than
private goods other than housing.
Our argument that the failure of employment in the local service
sectors to increase as rapidly as population implies a relative shortage
of local goods and services is based on the assumption that employment in the local service sectors is positively related to output. However, the relation is not necessarily directly proportional. Since per
capita income increases during impact, demand for local goods and
services should increase at a faster rate than population.
On the supply side excess capacity in local service sectors will
permit output to increase faster than employment in the early stages
of rapid growth. The excess capacity will eventually be used up and
then, unless the physical plant can be expanded at the same rate as
employment, output per employee should fall. The application of
the law of diminishing returns suggests that output will rise faster
than employment initially and then at a slower rate until physical
plants can be expanded. The likelihood that the relationships between demand and population and supply and employment are not
linear does not seriously qualify our conclusion that one major adverse effect of impact on the welfare of original residents is shortages
in local services, especially in the public sector.
The unbalanced growth associated with energy development results in higher costs for local goods and services and adversely affects
the welfare of residents living in affected communities including
original residents. New residents freely choose to accept these conditions in return for better employment opportunities. While original
residents do not reveal their willingness to accept these impact problems in return for benefits associated with rapid growth, there are
benefits for them. We now consider three possible sources of compensation to original residents that are inherent in impact. These
include higher incomes, increased value of real property, and the
prospect of less costly private and public goods and services.
The shortages in the local service sectors that are an important
factor in impact problems reflect shortages in productive resources.
These shortages of labor and real capital lead to increases in their
prices, which means higher incomes. We expect wages and salaries,
nonfarm proprietors' incomes from local business, and rents from
local property including housing to rise. The three other components
of personal income which include transfer payments, dividends, and
interest are not closely related to local conditions. Only increases in
income that reflect local conditions should be viewed as compensation for original residents. They represent inherent benefits associated with impact.
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Residents of impacted areas do enjoy significantly greater gains in
per capita income than the nation as a whole. In Sweetwater County
we estimate that per capita income increased by 18 percent in 1970
prices between 1970 and 1974 compared to 9 percent for the nation.' This more rapid increase in per capita income can be attributed primarily to increased earnings, which account for about 75
percent of all income in the nation.
Earnings per worker increases for two reasons. First, the tight
labor market causes earnings in virtually all sectors to increase. Second, the proportion of the labor force employed in higher paying
sectors such as construction increases sharply. In Sweetwater County
5 percent of the work force was employed in construction in 1970
compared to 29 percent in 1974. Average earnings in construction
were higher than in any other sector in 1974 and had increased by 49
percent since 1970 measured in constant (1970) dollars, the fastest
rate of increase of any sector. Increased earnings in construction
account for 57 percent of the total increase in earnings between
1970 and 1974 in Sweetwater County. Changes in earnings per
worker in other nonagricultural sectors ranged from an increase of 27
percent in private services to a decrease of 4 percent in manufacturing during the same period.
The increase in earnings paid to original residents depends on the
distribution of employed original residents among sectors and the
extent to which they take advantage of the employment opportunities created by the tight labor market by moving into higher paying
sectors and occupations. In the case of Sweetwater County we calculate that if all residents employed in 1970 continued to work in
the same sector and enjoyed the average rate of increase of earnings
in their sector, their earnings would have increased 16 percent between 1970 and 1974 measured in constant (1970) dollars. Average
weekly earnings in the United States declined by 10 percent in 1970
prices during the same period, so original residents fared far better
than the nation as a whole even if we allow no gains from mobility.
Gains from mobility include employment of original residents who
were either unemployed or not in the labor force before impact as
well as increased earnings resulting from shifts to higher paying sectors and occupations. The unemployment rate fell in Sweetwater
County from 5 percent in 1970 to 2.8 percent in 1973 and 1974. We
cannot tell how many original residents have entered the labor force
8. Income and earnings data used in the discussion are summarized in Table 2, at 28.
Information on U.S. figures is readily available. See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S., 1975. Earnings have been translated into 1970 equivalent by using the Consumer Price Index as deflator.
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since 1970 attracted by better employment opportunities. Recent
high school graduates and drop outs certainly enjoy better employment opportunities than was true in 1970. People over 65 and housewives who were not in the labor force in 1970 may also have swelled
the contribution of original residents to the growth of the work force
during the impact years.
We do not know the number of persons employed in 1970 who
shifted into higher paying sectors during impact. We do have the
results of a sample survey of original residents in Rock Springs and
Green River conducted in 1975 which gives the distribution of heads
of households among industrial sectors.' The distribution of heads of
households among sectors in 1970 was not available, but we have
compared the 1975 survey results with the distributions of all employed persons 16 and over and employed males 16 and over among
industrial sectors as reported in the 1970 Census.
If we make the assumption that the distribution of all employees
and males 16 years and older in 1975 approximated the distribution
of heads of households, then we conclude that a significant shift in
the employment of original residents has taken place towards higher
paying sectors, especially construction. If we make the further
assumptions that the distribution of all employees 16 years and older
in 1974 was the same as the distribution of household heads across
sectors reported in the sample survey of 1975, and that the number
of original residents in the labor force did not change from 1970,
then we calculate that employed original residents enjoyed an increase in earnings of 39 percent in 1970 prices between 1970 and
1974.
A 20 percent increase can be attributed to mobility into higher
paying sectors. These figures are rough estimates, but they show a
consistent pattern of significant gains in income from earnings for
original residents of Sweetwater County who were able to participate
in the labor force during the impact period.
The incomes of most members of the professions and small businessmen are included under proprietors' incomes. The only data we
have shows a decrease in nonfarm proprietors' incomes in Sweetwater County between 1970 and 1974 of 14 percent in constant
dollar (1970) prices. 1 0 We question the accuracy of this estimate,
9. The survey is included in a study conducted by Mountain West Research, Inc., for the
Old West Regional Comm., published December 1975. Industry of employed heads who are
long-time residents is shown in: Construction Worker Profile, Community Report: Rock
Springs and Green River, Wyoming, at 22 and 55.
10. BEA, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, estimate of nonfarm proprietors' income for Sweetwater County, Wyoming, 1970-1974.
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but on reflection it is not clear that small businessmen enjoy the
large gains from impact that we originally thought. We have noted
the private service sector in Sweetwater County expanded rapidly in
response to growth. This growth often means the entry of new businesses rather than expansion of older firms. Some of the newcomers
are large, efficient, and incorporated which means their income does
not show up as proprietors' income.
Older businesses may find themselves facing large, efficient competitors rather than more customers. Holiday Inn and McDonald's
may leave the small motel and restaurant worse off within a relatively short time than they were before rapid growth began. The
likelihood that some small businessmen are inefficient and unable to
adapt to the challenge of rapid growth and more competition is not a
plea for compensation, but a recognition that high incomes to original businesses may be exaggerated and are almost certainly temporary.
Rental income from local property is the last component of income to be considered. It should rise during impact and, to the
extent that rental property is owned by original residents and rented
to newcomers, higher rental income means a net addition in income
to original residents. Rent paid by original residents to original residents represents a transfer of income within the group rather than a
new addition to the group's income.
We have no reliable information on rental income from local property in Sweetwater County. Rental income is not a large component
of total income, however, accounting for only 2 percent of national
income in recent years. Combined payments of dividends, interest,
and rent paid to residents of Sweetwater County declined as a percent of personal income between 1970 and 1974. In 1970 rent,
dividends, and interest were 13.6 percent of personal income; in
1974 they accounted for only 8.5 percent.' I We have no evidence
that rents are a more significant source of income in impacted areas
than for the nation as a whole. Increased rental income during the
impact period could mean significant increases in the income of some
original residents, but its contribution to the net income of the group
and the number of persons involved would be relatively small.
Another source of potential compensation for original residents of
impacted areas is the increased value of real property they own. Real
property will be in short supply and command higher prices until the
stock is increased in response to population growth. The increase in
rental income on local property reflects its increased value. Original
11. BEA, U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, estimate of personal income for Sweetwater County,
Wyoming, 1970-1974.
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residents who own real property in the area but are not currently
renting it can realize the temporary increases in value only by selling
or renting it. If they sell or rent, they are no longer able to use the
property themselves. To continue their present pattern of activity
they must acquire the right to use equivalent property by purchasing
it or renting it. They can buy or rent in the area only at inflated
prices surrendering the gain from the sale of their original property,
so to realize their gain they must acquire equivalent property outside
the area. In the case of homeowners, the largest group of property
owners, this means moving out of the area. Most original residents
are not in a position to do this, and therefore they are unable to
realize the potential gain from the temporary increase in the value of
their property during the impact period.
A permanent increase in local property values could be realized by
many original residents at some future time such as retirement. Such
a permanent increase in the value of local property requires that the
value of land itself increases. This implies that the supply of available
land in the area that is desirable and accessible has become relatively
scarce. This presumes an increase in population and an increase in
intensity of land use exceeding the relatively modest size reached by
most impacted communities in the Rocky Mountain region.
This brings us to the last source of compensation for original
residents that is inherent in impact rather than an external policy
decision-better local services at a lower price at some future date.
We have already discussed the possibility that the expanded private service sector may be more efficient and more competitive. The
blessings of greater competition and larger and more efficient firms
should be lower prices and greater choice. In addition it may be
possible to profitably supply services to the larger population locally
that could not be supplied to the pre-impact population. These are
genuine gains for all residents. Since the private service sector seems
to respond vigorously to growth, the benefits may not be delayed
beyond the first year or two of rapid growth. How much improvement in the local private service sector there will be in the long run
depends on the permanent post-impact population.
The arguments for potential benefits in the private service sector
can also be applied to the local public sector. A larger population
may result in improved public services and a reduction in their per
capita cost because of greater economies of scale. There is an additional source of potential compensation for original residents in the
public service sector, however, which has been widely discussed.
Additional taxes collected from the new projects are offered as the
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quid pro quo for the cost that these projects impose on impacted
communities.
We postpone the question whether the benefits to original residents from an eventual decline in their tax burden is adequate compensation for all costs associated with impact. Instead we will argue
that the minimum conditions necessary for an eventual reduction in
the tax burden of original residents are satisfied, but that problems
created by the institutional framework through which local public
services are financed are serious barriers to appropriating the potential benefits for original residents. By a reduction in the tax burden
of residents we mean that taxes collected from residents could be
lowered with no reduction in the level of public services provided
them.
The claim that industry reduces the tax burden of residents assumes that local government collects more in taxes from industry
than it spends providing local services to industry. If the assumption
is true, then a surplus of revenue over cost can be collected from
industry and used to subsidize services for households. However,
even if new industry pays more in taxes than it costs local government to provide it with services, it does not follow that the tax
burden of original residents will be lower. If the new industry causes
the area population to increase by a greater proportion than the
revenue surplus collected from industry, then the subsidy received by
each household from industry declines and the tax burden of original
residents increases.
Energy related projects impose negligible demands for direct services from local governments and invest large amounts of capital per
employee, so we can anticipate that the conditions for a potential
reduction in the tax burden of original residents are met.
While the necessary conditions for a potential fall in the tax burden of original residents are satisfied by energy projects, the mechanisms for financing local government services may prevent this
potential benefit from being exploited to the advantage of original
residents. One difficulty is that the projects may not be in the taxing
jurisdiction of communities providing services for the increased
population. The population of individual communities may increase
by a greater proportion than their revenues from industry net of
costs of providing services to industry even though net revenue from
industry grows at a faster rate than population for the area as a
whole. The result is the tax burden of original residents in some
communities could increase.
A second problem which has been widely discussed is the lag
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between the need for increased public services and the receipt of
additional revenues from the new projects. The phrase "front end
problem" succinctly summarizes the difficulty. New residents arrive
before new revenues. The result is that the demand for an expansion
of local services to households occurs before the additional revenues
from new projects are available. If we add the time needed to plan
and prepare for an orderly and efficient expansion of public services,
the lag in revenue response is even more serious.
The need for additional revenue before the increases in taxes paid
by new projects is available could be met by borrowing against future
revenues, but the bonding powers of local governments are restricted
by states in ways that often make a rational borrowing program
impossible. The result is an unhappy compromise between imposing
higher taxes on residents to provide the revenue needed to expand
services or permitting the level of services to decline.
In both cases the tax burden of original residents increases in the
short run. This short-run increase in the tax burden must be compared with the potential long-run decrease to determine whether
changes in the tax burden accompanying rapid development are a net
benefit to original residents. To determine whether additional net
revenues collected from energy development adequately compensates
original residents we have to know both the magnitude and duration
of the fluctuation in the tax burden and the value original residents
place on present as opposed to future benefits.
The experience of Sweetwater County confirms the potential
benefits of energy related development to original residents in the
form of lower tax burdens and illustrates both the jurisdictional and
front-end problems. Assessed valuation of real property which includes extracted mineral resources increased by 64 percent between
1970 and 1974, lagging well behind the estimated population increase of at least 87 percent during the period.' 2
The tax base has not expanded at as rapid a rate as population for
the first 3-4 years of rapid development. By 1975, however, assessed
valuation for the county was 140 percent over its 1970 level surpassing the rate of increase in population which remained virtually unchanged from 1974. Completion of three units of a power plant,
substantial increases in coal production, increases in the value but
not the quantity of oil production, and increased trona mining
accounted for 70 percent of the increase in assessed valuation between 1970 and 1975. The increase in assessed valuation of energy
12. Assessed valuation and mill levy data used in this section are summarized in Table 3,

at 29.
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and trona related development alone from 1970 to 1975 is almost
equal to total valuation in 1970. Assessed valuation is continuing to
increase rapidly and population growth has tapered off, so the formal
requirements for an eventual reduction in the tax burden of residents
of the county are being fulfilled.
The jurisdictional problem is reflected in the much slower rates of
growth in assessed valuation for Rock Springs and Green River. While
county valuation increased by 140 percent, Rock Spring's assessed
valuation increased by only 37 percent and Green River's by 85
percent. Although almost 90 percent of the county's population lives
in these two communities, their increased valuation has accounted
for only slightly more than 6 percent of the total increase for the
county between 1970 and 1975. Other evidence that the tax burden
of residents has increased over the first four years of rapid development is the mill levy and the imposition of an optional 1 percent
sales tax by the county in January 1974. The mill levy in Rock
Springs increased by 1.1 percent from 1970 to 1975; Green River's
mill levy increased by 25.3 percent during the same period. The sales
tax is still in force.
In summary, taxes paid by residents have risen since 1970 while
plans for additional expenditures on capital improvements by local
governments and the lag in employment in the local public sector
both indicate a deterioration in local public services. We conclude
that the tax burden of original residents has increased. Taxes paid by
impacting firms are increasing rapidly, but residents of Sweetwater
County have experienced an increase in their tax burden for an extended period, perhaps as long as five or six years.
AN ALTERNATIVE POLICY FOR IMPACT PROBLEMS
Our review of the experience of Sweetwater County makes clear
that equity and efficiency problems are associated with rapid energy
development in the Rocky Mountain region. Our analysis has focused
on the welfare of original residents. Rapid unbalanced growth with
local service sectors expanding less rapidly than population causes
prices to rise in lagging sectors. We cannot accurately measure the
extent of the price rise which includes both nominal price increases
and declining quality in services. Problems of personal adjustment to
rapid growth are also evident and have been documented else1
where. 3
13. The Construction Worker Profile, Community Report on Rock Springs, at 1 and 32,
reports that the mental health clinic caseload increased by 885 percent between 1970 and
1975, with long-time residents making up the majority of new cases.
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Balanced against these costs are increases in incomes during the
period of rapid growth and the future possibilities of lower prices for
private services and a lower tax charge for improved public services.
Excepting for higher incomes, the benefits of growth are in the
future and the costs occur in the beginning. Higher incomes are due
primarily to higher earnings and reflect the same temporary shortages
that cause prices of local services to increase.
While costs of rapid growth affect all original residents, benefits
from gains in earnings are not as evenly distributed. Persons not in
the work force or unemployed do not share in higher earnings. This
includes most of the 7.3 percent of the population aged 65 or older
in 1970. The employed who are mobile and able to move to higher
paying occupations and sectors gain the most. Relatively immobile
workers employed in sectors where earnings do not grow rapidly gain
the least. We assume the mobile workers are generally younger and
the less mobile are older, established workers.
We conclude that original residents as a group are not automatically compensated for costs imposed on them during impact. All
original residents bear the burdens of higher taxes and reductions in
the quality of local services. Some are adequately compensated
through higher incomes, primarily through higher earnings and better
job opportunities. Others do not share significantly in these benefits
of rapid growth. The impact of rapid growth on the welfare of local
residents is not limited to the difficulties of maintaining an adequate
level of local public services, but the problems of local governments
also reveal inefficiencies and inequities in methods of financing local
public services which are exacerbated by impact conditions.
The response of policy makers has focused on front-end problems
and has been concerned primarily with providing additional funds to
local governments for expanding their infrastructures. Methods have
included relaxing bonding constraints on local governments, providing additional sources of tax revenues for them, and transferring
funds in the form of loans and grants from state to local governments. These methods fit comfortably within the traditional pattern
of fiscal relations between governments in our federal system and
address themselves to felt needs. We appreciate the intent of these
policies and the practical reasons for choosing them.
We are concerned that with some exceptions present policies fail
to directly attack the basic cause of impact problems or the most
important equity and efficiency problem involved in rapid energy
development. The basic cause of impact problems is the growth rate
of communities. Policy makers have tended to accept the growth and
offer aid to affected communities.
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Aid is biased towards capital needs rather than operating budgets,
even though the lag in employment in the public sector reflects an
inability of local governments to successfully compete for workers in
a tight labor market. This relative decline in employment as well as
an inadequate infrastructure contributes to the relatively greater
deterioration of public as compared to private services.
The most pressing equity problem is the impact of rapid growth
on the welfare of original residents. The related efficiency problem is
the failure of present policy to force investors to take account of the
costs their decisions impose on original residents in affected communities.
The policy we advocate as a means of directly addressing impact
problems is to require investors to contract with governments of
communities that will be significantly affected by rapid growth resulting from investor's decisions.
Areas of negotiation should include: a timetable for construction
with the number of workers specified and penalties for breaking the
schedule; plans for adequate housing and services for the construction work force; and payment to local governments for increases in
operating budgets and expansion of infrastructure.
The payments to local governments would be set in light of the
plans agreed upon for housing and providing services for the construction work force. The investor might prefer to provide many
services directly by constructing a temporary company town or he
might opt for contracting with the local communities to provide
needed services. Penalties for failure to live up to the terms of the
agreement including the construction schedule would be included in
the contract.
Granting local governments the power to protect the interest of
their citizens is the most direct method of insuring adequate compensation to the majority of original residents, a significantly affected
group whose welfare is not explicitly protected under current policies. Including them in the decision process is the best means of
safeguarding their interests and avoids third party interpretation of
their interests. We accept the premise implicit in the proposal that
local governments are the best available representatives of the interests of original residents.
The major objections to requiring negotiations between decision
makers and affected parties are the cost and the possibility of strategic behavior. Since the number of investors and communities likely
to be affected by projects is small and easily identified, the costs of
the proposed negotiations would not be unreasonable. Strategic
behavior is possible for both sides, of course, but the advantage rests
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with investors who have available the options of establishing new
communities or relocating the project. Arbitration by a third party
such as state government could be required in the event the two
primary parties could not agree.
The construction work force is singled out for special attention in
negotiations because it is the major contributor to the rapid growth
that creates impact problems. In Sweetwater County over half the
increase in the work force between 1970 and 1974 was in construction. If the size and timing of these temporary additions to the
population of the area were known in advance and adequate provisions made for them, the major cause of serious impact problems
would be relieved.
Decisions are more efficient when all costs and benefits are taken
into account by decision makers. Proposed negotiations force investors to take the costs and benefits imposed on residents in the project area into account before initiating the project. The penalties for
not following the construction schedule forces them to weigh the
costs that altering their plans imposes on affected communities. This
would not prohibit changes, but would insure that all costs involved
would be carefully considered and those adversely affected would be
compensated. It places the burden for planning carefully and accepting risk on the investors where it belongs.
The most direct and effective action that higher levels of government can take to improve the efficiency and equity of project decisions would be to establish the legal framework for the proposed
negotiations including safeguards for the interests of other citizens of
the state and nation, insure effective enforcement of agreements, and
provide expertise and information to officials in affected communities.
The contractual agreement between investors and local governments of affected commnities would be short-run agreements designed to meet the immediate equity and efficiency problems posed
by energy induced rapid growth. This is preferable to modifying the
present system for financing local services in the interests of meeting
temporary needs of rapidly growing communities. We have noted the
jurisdictional problems involved in present arrangements for funding
local government services. A careful assessment of the equity and
efficiency problems involved in present arrangements for funding
local government services is needed, but those long-run structural
problems should not be confused with special short-run needs of
rapidly growing communities.

April 19771

WELFARE IMPLICATIONS

n

n (N
.9,ONOtfl
~00 n n

(N

nON

00

non

aNne-

(N
00

I-c
n

•n t

naG
00 .On en r- 0
(Nc--n n en ON

n

n

-

nen-

ONn00

I-I-

NO(NO

ON

00-nON

o

(N %0t- n

-ON

en r-

en (N ON000

00N00

n

'O,-n

n

n en no
no
(N .0%O
0000
norr- - -

0
no

Olet~
He-

o

ON'one
COt~- -

onorooc
(NnI-00ONn

n e- e-

00

ON e0

0

-

(N

-

n

n

n-

(N

cnn

-

(N
en

-

(NnON
r-nn

ON

00

n

.-

o
ON 0=

-

0

)

E

.

[Vol. 17

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

M0

oc

t ,I

-0
cI

00 c 000 N

.0
C100C,
c )c
0r0l
r-

rO

en

VN
en
cc

0

0I

E

0
N-t0cl

oo -

r- 00

00

N

c)00
'0C

Wc-en
00

0
U
ON
ce

cI0cc0 r
00

fl-

c 0 ON
CDi -

'0

c

rn

cc
ON
V)

00

- 0
M kn

>

0

0

6s

o

en cc) (7 -r 0 --

0

E
0

E

0

a

m

N,.)
-

N

cc

en

mne
0

0

r

's

0

0)0C)
C-I m0
0I 'IT CN 0, W

r-

00
C0~

r

00
0X

Ncc,

00r-

,i E

en
cc

0

0

-u

0

02

r-

0

ONc
OE

0

0~

q

0

0

i

~0~
r

0
E1

a,
o0
ci

- .

0..

E
0

0

0

0.
00
ci

0,

00
u

0

*5o0~~oE.

0.00t
cc0

.

U 0
0s-

o

0a

u
go

C

>cc

April 1977]

WELFARE IMPLICATIONS

00

00.

0

_r

N
00
0

0a
%70
000

00

NNq

Sf)

00
m

rE,
0
0'. CC)

ON)n

N

,.€

-o-

N
c'.)c-0'

'0

N

-

00
C-

o

N r-

'00
cn ')
-

0
W')

0O
0-C.0C
00 )

r-

00
00
00

W')0'

nr

n0' 00

*0
03~0

0M n 0N-00
,I
'.0 N: C)
CO

o z
=s

r-

0'.0.
N 0'n .)

C

0'
0'G
q '0

0
0)

ct

o
>0)C) .
- >. m

~0
'

>" >'

W.

0'..
mC0
0_N

0')

0

'.00.)
0"

